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“[W]hen there is an income tax, the just man will pay more and the 
unjust less on the same amount of income.” — Plato1 
INTRODUCTION 
Globalization has produced a world where capital is highly mobile and 
deployed across multiple taxing jurisdictions by single corporate taxpayers. 
This mismatch between global capital and national taxing jurisdictions has 
proved vexing for national taxing authorities as they attempt to allocate 
global corporate income and deductions on a national basis. One of the 
most significant manifestations of this allocation problem is the 
phenomenon of multi-national enterprises (MNEs) shifting profits to 
relatively low-tax jurisdictions through intra-firm transfer pricing, creating 
what is called the transfer pricing problem. 
To illustrate the problem, consider the hypothetical case of a United 
States company that wishes to build a factory in Hong Kong for the 
manufacture of flat screen televisions, with the intention of marketing the 
televisions in the U.S. Assume a marginal cost of production of $100, a 
retail price of $150, and U.S. and Hong Kong corporate income tax rates of 
35%2 and 16.5%,3 respectively. In terms of corporate structure, the parent 
 
 *    Duke University School of Law, J.D. 2012; Harvard Divinity School, M.T.S. 2009; Baldwin-
Wallace College, B.A. 2007. I would like to thank Katherine Hunter, Catherine Lawson, and 
Loni Schutte for their excellent editorial work. This note is dedicated to my wife, Lara, to whom I owe 
everything. 
 1.  Plato, THE REPUBLIC, bk. I, at 18, (Paul Negri & Joslyn T. Pine, eds., Benjamin Jowett, trans., 
Dover Publishing rev. ed. 2000) (c. 360 B.C.E.). 
 2.  A simplifying assumption. See 26 U.S.C. § 11. 
 3.  DELOITTE, CORPORATE TAX RATES 2012, available at http://www.deloitte.com/assets/Dcom-
Global/Local%20Assets/Documents/Tax/Taxation%20and%20Investment%20Guides/matrices/dttl_cor
porate_tax_rates_2012.pdf. 
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company (Parent) has two basic options: build the factory as a foreign 
branch within the corporate structure of Parent, or establish the factory 
through a wholly owned subsidiary (Sub) incorporated as a Hong Kong 
entity. Under the first option, the tax consequences are relatively 
straightforward. Since Parent both manufactures and sells the televisions, a 
U.S. tax is assessed on the profit derived by Parent from the manufacture 
and sale, which will be roughly equivalent to the sale price less the cost of 
production, or $50 x 35% = $17.50 corporate tax assessed per unit sold. 
The second option introduces an additional step in the chain of 
production and sale. Upon manufacture of the televisions, the Parent must 
set the transfer price—the intra-firm price the Sub will charge the Parent—
for the televisions. Consider the pricing incentives in light of the 
considerable rate differential between the U.S. and Hong Kong. In the 
absence of any restrictions on the intra-firm price, the natural incentive will 
be to set the transfer price at $150 per television, booking $50 of profit to 
the Sub and $0 of profit to Parent. This price minimizes the overall tax 
burden to the firm by locating the entire profit of the production and sale 
enterprise in Hong Kong, the low-tax jurisdiction. In this hypothetical, a 
Hong Kong tax is assessed on the sale to Parent of $50 x 16.5% = $8.25 
corporate tax assessed per unit. Parent realizes no gain on the resale of the 
televisions in the U.S., and accordingly no U.S. tax is levied.4 From this 
example we see that the transfer price effectively functions to allocate 
profit between Parent and Sub, with the blended tax rate on the productive 
activity equal to the average of the two tax rates weighted by the 
percentage of profits allocated to each jurisdiction, respectively.5 
The above example illustrates how transfer pricing creates the 
incentive for MNEs to shift profits to low tax jurisdictions. Absent some 
legal constraint, the transfer pricing problem would erode the corporate tax 
base of relatively high-tax jurisdictions. The prevailing legal mechanism 
for preventing this erosion, embodied in U.S. law6 and as an international 
standard,7 is to adjust the price of the transaction to reflect what the parties 
would have bargained for at arms-length. This principle, known as the 
arms-length standard (ALS), requires firms to set transfer prices according 
 
 4.  The tax savings of this arrangement is technically in deferral of US tax. If and when the 
profits of Sub are repatriated in the form of a dividend to Parent, the amount of the dividend will be 
taxed at ordinary rates, less any applicable foreign tax credit. However, the possibility of a so-called 
“repatriation holiday” gives transfer pricing-effected deferrals the potential to become permanent 
savings. 
 5.  See, e.g., infra note 9 and accompanying text. 
 6.  See 26 U.S.C. § 482. 
 7.  See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC CO-OPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, OECD TRANSFER 
PRICING GUIDELINES FOR MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISES AND TAX ADMINISTRATORS 31-33 (2010). 
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to their hypothetical equivalent arms-length price, and empowers taxing 
authorities to reset prices, reallocating income and deductions accordingly. 
This price setting is principally achieved by looking to comparable 
uncontrolled prices and transactions. 
Consider how ALS would be used to correct strategic pricing behavior 
in the original hypothetical. If the Parent sets the transfer price of the 
televisions at $150 in an attempt to realize 100% of the gain in the low tax 
jurisdiction, the Parent’s taxing authority can use ALS to restructure the 
transaction to reflect what Parent and Sub would have bargained for had 
they been independent parties dealing at arms-length. Under U.S. law, § 
482 of the Internal Revenue Code empowers the Secretary (through the 
Internal Revenue Service (IRS)) to make such adjustments, and a complex 
array of accompanying regulations describe the standards for making 
appropriate adjustments in particular circumstances.8 For a transaction 
involving the sale of televisions, a relatively fungible physical good, the 
Secretary is likely to apply the comparable uncontrolled price (CUP) 
method.9 The IRS might, for instance, look at the market and determine 
that for comparable transactions of sufficiently similar televisions between 
independent manufacturers and third party distributors, the market price is 
$120. Accordingly, the IRS would reallocate $30 of profit per unit sold to 
the Parent, and assess $30 x 35% = $10.50 corporate tax per unit.10 
The ALS functions to mitigate the effects of the transfer pricing 
problem in so far as it is a generally accepted standard that enables taxing 
authorities to allocate the taxable income of MNEs, thereby staving off the 
erosion of the corporate tax base of high-tax jurisdictions. However, this 
paper will argue that the ALS is an inadequate solution on two related 
grounds. First, ALS contradicts the economic reality of intra-firm 
transactions by effectively treating the relatedness of the parties as 
incidental, rather than integral to the transaction. For instance, Parent and 
Sub in the above example are a single integrated productive enterprise; the 
transfer price charged between them is wholly arbitrary and has no 
economic substance. Second, because a hypothetical arms-length transfer 
price does not correspond to economic reality, ALS suffers from a lack of 
administrability. This lack of administrability is symptomatic of a 
dysfunctional regulatory framework with burdensome compliance 
requirements, multiple layers of subjective judgment about allocation, and 
a lack of correspondence to any reasonable measure of how the global 
 
 8.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1 et seq. 
 9.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3 (as amended in 1995).  
 10.  The new blended tax rate on the productive activity of Parent and Sub given the 60/40 profit 
split would be (0.6)(35%) + (0.4)(16.5%) = 27.6%. 
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corporate tax base ought to be allocated. In light of this dual failure, this 
paper proposes a framework for developing alternative solutions to the 
transfer problem, which use real and readily ascertainable economic factors 
to allocate the global corporate tax base according to benefits enjoyed and 
burdens imposed upon the tax jurisdictions where MNEs transact business. 
This paper further proposes that the best method for making allocations 
based on benefit/burden analysis is formulary apportionment, and to that 
end this paper suggests a novel implementation of formulary apportionment 
based on applying different formulas tailored to different categories of 
income. 
Part I of this paper details the transfer pricing problem in the context 
of taxing multinational entities and the prevailing legal mechanism for 
setting transfer prices, the arms-length standard. Part II details the 
deficiency of ALS as a legal standard that misrepresents the economics of 
intra-firm transfers and accordingly fails as a mechanism for allocating the 
global corporate tax base. Part III considers alternatives and reforms to 
ALS, evaluating existing unilateral and multilateral reform proposals in 
terms of their ability to index proportional taxability of MNE income to 
burdens and benefits in particular jurisdictions using real, readily 
ascertainable economic factors. 
I. AN OVERVIEW OF THE TRANSFER PRICING PROBLEM: 
DIVIDING THE INTERNATIONAL TAX PIE 
Transfer pricing is more than just a technical issue for taxing 
authorities. Several features of the contemporary tax landscape combine to 
make transfer pricing a high priority for both national taxing authorities and 
international organizations such as the OECD. The first condition is the 
ever-increasing transnational nature of global economic activity. Though it 
may now be an obvious point, the world is interconnected across national 
boundaries, due in large part to advances in information technology, such 
that physical distance and cultural differences are no longer the barriers to 
international trade they once were. This translates to an increasing portion 
of the global corporate tax base deriving from international trade. Consider, 
for example, the fifty most profitable companies in the U.S. in 2010, which 
accounted for 38% of all US corporate profits.11 Fully half of their profits 
derived from foreign sources, and in 2010 alone these fifty firms 
accumulated $681 billion in undistributed foreign earnings.12 For many 
 
 11.  Martin A. Sullivan, Foreign Tax Profile of Top 50 U.S. Companies, 132 TAX NOTES 330, 330 
(July 25, 2011). 
 12.  Id. 
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sources of income, such as the licensing of intellectual property rights to 
foreign subsidiaries or the domestic sale of goods produced by foreign 
subsidiaries, transfer prices will determine the proportion of profit realized 
in the domestic and foreign jurisdictions. Furthermore, over sixty percent 
of all international trade is carried out within MNEs.13 By implication, the 
majority of all cross-border transactional activity is priced internally rather 
than by markets at arms-length. 
The second significant feature of the contemporary landscape is the 
wide differential in corporate tax rates between high-tax jurisdictions and 
low-tax jurisdictions.14 As illustrated by the U.S.-Hong Kong example, 
large rate differentials create natural and compelling incentives to shift 
profits to low-tax jurisdictions through transfer pricing. This incentive, 
when combined with the ubiquitous opportunities created by the massive 
scale of internally-priced transnational business, produces the “transfer 
pricing problem,” where MNEs shift income to minimize taxes, ultimately 
to the detriment of revenue collection in higher-tax jurisdictions like the 
United States. 
A. The First Implementation of ALS: Preserving a New Corporate Tax 
Base 
The need to address transfer pricing became apparent soon after the 
institution of the first income tax in the U.S. and other nations at the start of 
the 20th century.15 The U.S. and United Kingdom enacted the first 
legislation designed to combat the shifting of profits offshore through 
transfer pricing during World War I.16 In the U.S., the War Revenue Act of 
1917 empowered the Commissioner to order MNEs to file consolidated 
returns to more equitably determine taxable income.17 Subsequent versions 
of this statutory authority were drafted as a more general power to 
reallocate income and deductions among related entities in a control 
group—the conceptual origins of modern § 482.18 By 1935, ALS was 
formalized in U.S. tax regulations as the standard to be used when 
reallocating income and deductions among controlled groups of taxpayers 
 
 13.  Ad Hoc Group of Experts on International Cooperation in Tax Matters, Transfer Pricing: 
History, State of the Art, Perspectives, 10th mtg at 2, U.N. Doc. ST/SG/AC.8/2001/CRP.6 (June 26, 
2001) [hereinafter Transfer Pricing: History, State of the Art, Perspectives]. 
 14.  See DELOITTE, supra note 3. 
 15.  See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length: a Study in the Evolution of 
U.S. International Taxation, 15 VA. TAX REV. 89, 95 (1995) [hereinafter The Rise and Fall of Arm’s 
Length]. 
 16.  Transfer Pricing: History, State of the Art, Perspectives, supra note 13, at 5. 
 17.  The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length, supra note 15, at 95. 
 18.  Id. at 96. 
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to reflect the “true” taxable income of the individual entities.19 The 
legislative history of the implementation of this power to reallocate income 
using ALS indicates a concern by lawmakers that related corporate entities 
could too easily shift profits through questionable internal sales, and that 
therefore the government should have the power to “allocate income where 
it belongs” and reflect their “true” tax liability.20 There was no discussion 
of what standard might govern “true” tax liability.21 
When ALS was codified, policy makers did not articulate clear 
reasons for why ALS should be the standard employed to protect against 
income shifting through transfer pricing. As the early history of ALS in the 
U.S. indicates, the standard grew out of a more general sense that tax 
authorities needed latitude to adjust the income allocations within MNEs in 
order to protect the collection of taxes that were fairly owed to the U.S. 
government. This impulse is indicative of the prevailing intellectual and 
legislative sentiment in the early years of the corporate income tax, the 
justification for which was premised upon the benefits conferred by 
government to businesses—namely, the preconditions enabling the 
productive activity.22 Thomas Adams, the international tax advisor to the 
U.S. Treasury in the 1910s and 1920s,23 described the prevailing 
intellectual and legislative rationale for entity-level income taxation: 
 
From political and moral standpoints, the justification for this great class 
of taxes is plain. A large part of the cost of government is traceable to the 
necessity of maintaining a suitable business environment. . . . Business is 
responsible for much of the work which occupies the courts, the police, 
the fire department, the army, and the navy. . . . The relationship between 
private business and the cost of government is a loose one, much like the 
relationship between the expenses of a railroad and the amount of traffic 
which it carries. The connection, however, is real and, in the long run, 
the more business the greater will be certain fundamental costs of 
government. . . . Surveyed from one point of view, business ought to be 
taxed because it costs money to maintain a market and those costs should 
in some way be distributed over all the beneficiaries of that market. 
Looking at the same question from another viewpoint, a market is a 
 
 19.  Id. at 97. 
 20.  Id. (quoting 69 CONG. REC. 605 (1927) (statement of Rep. William R. Green), cited in J. 
SEIDMAN, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF FEDERAL INCOME TAX LAWS 1938-1861, 522 (1938)). 
 21.  Id. 
 22.  See Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, All of a Piece Throughout: The Four Ages of U.S. International 
Taxation, 25 VA. TAX REV. 313, 317 (2005). 
 23.  Id. at 318. 
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valuable asset to the social group which maintains it and communities 
ought to charge for the use of community assets.24 
 
This benefits-based justification, which conceives of corporate taxes 
as covering the shared cost of maintaining public markets, carries the 
concomitant need to preserve a corporate tax base commensurate with that 
cost. Informed by this reasoning, the ambiguous references to an MNE’s 
“true” tax liability suggest that policy makers were expressing at least in 
part frustration that purported tax liabilities often did not square with the 
benefits enjoyed and burdens imposed by MNEs. Thus their stated 
justifications for reallocation provisions using ALS, though technically 
imprecise, reflect both a moral and practical concern for the preservation of 
the corporate tax base against the eroding forces of the transfer pricing 
problem. 
What utility early policy makers may have found in using ALS in 
particular as the corrective principal will be discussed in  Part II. Adjusting 
transfer prices using ALS was likely a more reasonable mechanism in the 
1920s and 1930s, given the state of MNEs at that time.25 However, policy 
makers did not justify ALS in terms of its technical implementation; that 
implementation, along with more formal justifications, evolved gradually 
over the ensuing decades. Rather, ALS was both adopted and justified to 
preserve a corporate tax base intended to generate revenue proportionate to 
the costs borne by government in its support of public markets. 
B. The Modern Implementation of ALS 
To consider how ALS is currently implemented in national tax 
regimes, the U.S. transfer pricing rules can serve as a representative 
example, because the U.S. standards for determining comparable arms-
length transactions are substantially similar to the OECD Guidelines and 
most modern national taxing regimes.26 
The U.S. transfer pricing rules rely on § 482 of the Internal Revenue 
Code, which empowers the taxing authority to allocate income and 
deductions among related entities of a control group when “necessary in 
order to prevent evasion of taxes or clearly to reflect the income of any 
 
 24.  Thomas S. Adams, The Taxation of Business, 11 PROC. ANN. CONF., NAT’L TAX ASS’N 185, 
187 (1917). 
 25.  Among other factors, the technology necessary to centrally manage multinational enterprises 
was not sufficiently developed. Accordingly, related entities of multinational groups may have operated 
with sufficient independents such that transfer pricing was a reasonable method for ensuring the proper 
allocation of group income. 
 26.  See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 482 (2006) and accompanying regulations; Income and Corporations 
Taxes Act, 1988, c. 1, § 770 (U.K.); OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 7.  
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such organizations, trades, or businesses.”27 There is no reference in the 
statute itself to the use of ALS as the guiding principle for such allocations. 
As noted in the prior section, ALS was codified as the guiding standard for 
reallocations in 1935.28 While regulations dictated the standard, the 
technical standards for implementing ALS first developed through the 
courts for the first few decades, with uneven results, and often a failure to 
strictly adhere to ALS itself when evaluating challenges to revenue service 
reallocations.29 Uniform technical standards for applying ALS were finally 
promulgated in the regulations in 1968.30 
In the present transfer pricing regime, firms are required to set internal 
prices according to ALS, and the IRS is empowered to reset those prices to 
properly reflect an arms-length result. Determining a particular price 
requires recourse to three sets of rules. The first category of rules set forth a 
variety of methods for producing an arms-length result for different kinds 
of transactions.31 A second set of rules are provided to choose which of the 
methods should be used in a particular case (the best method rule).32 Third, 
the regulations provide a list of factors for evaluating the degree of 
comparability between controlled and uncontrolled transactions in light of 
all the facts and circumstances.33 These three aspects of the transfer pricing 
rules are considered below. 
The categories of intra-company transaction for which the regulations 
prescribe methods include loans, money advances, the use of tangible 
property, and the transfer of tangible and intangible property.34 Taking the 
common case of intra-company sales of tangible property as an example, § 
1.482-3(a) sets out five acceptable methods for determining whether a 
transfer price adequately reflects what unaffiliated parties would have 
bargained for at arms-length.35 The “comparable uncontrolled price 
method” compares the price charged in the controlled transaction with the 
price in a comparable uncontrolled transaction.36 The “resale price 
method,” rather than comparing the total price of a comparable transaction, 
compares the gross profit margin of the controlled resale transaction with 
 
 27.  26 U.S.C. § 482. 
 28.  See The Rise and Fall of Arm’s Length, supra note 15, at 97. 
 29.  See id. at 104-07. 
 30.  Id. at 107. 
 31.  Treas. Reg. § 1.482-3(a) (1995). 
 32.  Id. § 1.482-1(c)(1) (as amended in 2009). 
 33.  See generally id. § 1.482-1(c)(2). 
 34.  Id. § 1.482-1(a)(1). 
 35.  See id. § 1.482-3(a). 
 36.  Id. § 1.482-3(b). 
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the margin earned in a comparable uncontrolled resale.37 The “cost plus 
method” compares the percentage markup from the cost of production in 
the controlled transaction to comparable uncontrolled profit markups.38 The 
“comparable profits method” is a financially complex method which 
determines profit level indicators from similarly situated uncontrolled 
taxpayers and compares these profit levels to that of the controlled party.39 
Finally, the “profit split method” is another financially complex method 
which divides profit and loss between the two controlled taxpayers based 
on the profit split of similarly situated uncontrolled entities (the 
“comparable profit split”), or divided in reference to the market rate of 
return to each taxpayers contribution to the economic activity (the “residual 
profit split”).40 
There is no prescribed hierarchy or priority of methods for evaluating 
a transfer price. The regulations provide only the best method rule, which 
simply requires that the best method among those given for a particular 
form of transaction be used.41 A method is “best” only if “the 
comparability, quality of data, and reliability of assumptions under that 
method make it more reliable than any other measure of the arm’s length 
result.”42 The regulations give various examples of comparative analyses 
between alternative methods to determine the “best” option, but the 
standards in the definition are quite loose, and not surprisingly a source of 
uncertainty and dispute in practice.43 
The final aspect of the ALS determination is the evaluation of the 
comparability between the controlled and uncontrolled transactions.44 To 
be an appropriate measure of whether a transfer price reflects arms-length 
dealing, the uncontrolled transaction must be sufficiently comparable. Five 
aspects of the uncontrolled transaction must be comparable to the 
controlled transaction: the parties must have comparable functions (e.g., 
manufacturer and distributor), contractual terms, risks, economic 
conditions, and property or services (i.e., a sale of toasters is not 
comparable to a sale of computers).45 
 
 37.  See id. § 1.482-3(c). 
 38.  See id. § 1.482-3(d). 
 39.  See generally id. § 1.482-5. 
 40.  See id. § 1.482-6; CHARLES H. GUSTAFSON & RICHARD CRAWFORD PUGH, TAXATION OF 
INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 748 (Charles H. Gustafson, et. al. eds., 4th ed. 1995). 
 41.  Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c); § 1.482-8(a). 
 42.  Id. § 1.482-8(a). 
 43.  See RUFUS VON THULEN RHOADES & MARSHALL J. LANGER, US INTERNATIONAL TAXATION 
& TAX TREATIES § 18.03. 
 44.  See Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(c)(2)(i). 
 45.  Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d)(1). 
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It is clear even from this cursory overview of transfer pricing rules 
that there are highly subjective judgments required at each stage of 
determining the arms-length price for an intra-firm transaction. Regardless 
of which method a taxpayer chooses as “best” for determining an arms-
length price, the choice will always be open to second-guessing, and “the 
district director’s temptation to second-guess will be, in most cases, more 
than he can resist.”46 Determining comparability of an independent 
transaction requires evaluating the five factors, and the regulations 
prescribe multiple standards of comparability within each of those factors.47 
Compliance with this price-setting system of subjective judgments upon 
subjective judgments is, not surprisingly, a source of concern and 
enormous administrative expense on the part of MNEs, as compliance 
requires careful documentation of intra-company transfers and the rationale 
for chosen transfer prices.48 As a consequence, businesses regularly cite 
transfer pricing as the most difficult and burdensome tax issue they face.49 
Audit of transfer prices is a constant concern in every country where MNEs 
transact business.50 The subjective nature of the pricing rules, predictably, 
produces commensurate subjectivity and uncertainty in compliance. 
C. The Modern Justification of ALS 
Given the considerable complexity and subjective judgments required 
to determine a hypothetical arms-length price for an intra-company 
transfer, what are the justifications for preserving this regime? As discussed 
in Part I.A, the implementation of ALS was justified at the outset only in 
terms of its function as a tool for the preservation of the corporate tax base, 
without any further theoretical focus on ALS per se. However, as ALS 
developed into a global standard, governments and international institutions 
developed a clear set of policy justifications for its continued use. 
The most prominent articulation of these policy rationales, consistent 
with the U.S. and other OECD member countries, is by the model rules for 
transfer pricing promulgated by the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development, the OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for 
Multinational Enterprises and Tax Administrators (the “Guidelines”). The 
Guidelines function as model rules and all OECD member countries have 
agreed to incorporate the OECD standards into their own tax 
 
 46.  RHOADES & LANGER, supra note 43, § 18.03. 
 47.  See generally Treas. Reg. § 1.482-1(d). 
 48.  See RHOADES & LANGER, supra note 43, § 18.02. 
 49.  See Rufus Rhoades, Rufus Rhoades on the Even More Curious Case of Xilinx, Inc. v. 
Commissioner, 2010 EMERGING ISSUES 4850, 4 (Aug. 9, 2010) (LEXIS). 
 50.  Id. 
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administrations.51 Accordingly, the rationale for ALS articulated in the 
Guidelines can be considered the generally agreed-upon justification for the 
use of ALS to set transfer prices. 
In describing the role of transfer pricing in MNEs and the associated 
risk of income distortion, the Guidelines set out an important assumption 
about the nature of intra-firm prices. “It should not be assumed that the 
conditions established in the commercial and financial relations between 
associated enterprises will invariably deviate from what the open market 
would demand.”52 This critical assumption made by the Guidelines—that 
the related entities in a single control group related to one another in a way 
economically analogous to similar unrelated enterprises—indicates that 
from the standpoint of the Guidelines, ALS is used to set “real” prices.53 
Even where there is no intent on the part of an MNE to minimize or avoid 
taxes, an adjustment using ALS may be appropriate.54 The assumption that 
arms-length prices reflect economic reality of intra-firm transactions, 
though not made fully explicit in the Guidelines, is the first and most 
significant justification for the ALS regime. The Guidelines suggest that 
the structure of MNEs distorts natural prices, even if inadvertently, and that 
ALS corrects that distortion. 
The second stated justification for ALS is closely related to the first. 
When ALS corrects the price distortions created by intra-firm transactions, 
it provides “broad parity of tax treatment for members of MNE groups and 
independent enterprises.”55 The artificial tax advantages produced by MNE 
transfer pricing would otherwise “distort the relative competitive positions” 
of the two types of entities.56 Furthermore, eliminating this artificial 
competitive advantage promotes the growth of international trade and 
investment.57 Similar to the first justification for ALS, the necessary 
implication of this stated purpose is the assumption that the difference 
between related entities in an industry and individual entities performing 
similar productive functions, but independently, is that the related group 
has the opportunity to distort its tax bill and thereby gain an artificial 
advantage over the independent entities. According to the Guidelines, the 
two scenarios have the same economic reality, but with the potential for 
different tax consequences, a distortion that ALS corrects. 
 
 51.  See OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 18. 
 52.  Id. at 32. 
 53.  See id. 
 54.  Id. at 31. 
 55.  Id. at 34. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Id. 
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The third stated justification for ALS as the global transfer pricing 
regime is a functional one. The Guidelines recognize that taxation of MNEs 
is a global problem requiring collective action. The OECD itself represents 
collective movement away from tax competition and towards 
coordination.58 ALS is a broadly accepted standard, integrated into 
individual states’ tax laws as well as bilateral treaties, including Article 9 of 
OECD Model Tax Convention.59 Insofar as ALS is widely and uniformly 
implemented, its role as a facilitator of collective action is a core 
justification for its continued use. It is especially useful for avoiding double 
taxation, which is the central objective of bilateral tax treaties. When one 
taxing authority makes an adjustment to the income of an entity using ALS, 
the fact that other tax jurisdictions where the MNE does business allocate 
income using the same standard reduces the chances of conflicting 
allocations that lead to double taxation. For these reasons, along with the 
stated theoretical justifications, the Guidelines express a firm stay-the-
course attitude with respect to ALS. 
II. THE FAILURE OF THE ARMS-LENGTH STANDARD 
Using the term “failure” to describe any legal rule, much less a global 
legal regime, can tend toward hyperbole. Nevertheless, to the extent that 
ALS is clearly inadequate to the task it is implemented to fulfill—the 
allocation of the corporate tax base of MNEs—ALS is a failed doctrine. 
Central to this failure is the disconnect between the assumptions at the core 
of ALS about the nature of intra-firm transactions and the economic reality 
of those transactions. With the increasing pace of globalization, this 
disconnect between the assumptions of ALS and the reality of global 
commerce will only widen, and the use of ALS to allocate global income 
on a national basis less tenable. 
A. The Economic Fallacy of ALS 
Recall that the OECD Guidelines offer two related theoretical 
justifications for ALS: that it corrects distortions of “real” prices in intra-
firm transactions, and in so doing levels the competitive playing field 
between related and independent entities that otherwise perform 
economically identical productive functions. The implicit assumption about 
intra-firm transactions generally is that the relatedness of the transacting 
parties is incidental, rather than integral to the transaction. Thus, setting the 
 
 58.  See id. at 18. 
 59.  Id. at 33. 
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transfer price to the hypothetical market price supposedly puts the MNE on 
equal footing with similar non-integrated actors. 
The treatment of the relatedness of parties as incidental to intra-firm 
transactions is the economic fallacy at the heart of ALS. Rather than 
incidental, the relatedness of the members of a control group is essential to 
the transactions within the group. But for the relatedness of the parties as 
part of a common enterprise, they would not enter into the transactions. An 
MNE, though various productive functions may be distributed among 
constituent members across multiple taxing jurisdictions, is a single 
integrated productive enterprise. 
To treat MNEs as related only for tax distortive purposes, as ALS 
impliedly does, is to fundamentally misunderstand the nature of an 
integrated firm. Integrated firms arise precisely in order to deviate from 
arms-length prices in comparable uncontrolled transactions.60 Integrated 
firms can take advantage of economies of scale, organizational efficiencies 
and saved transaction costs.61 The assumption that adjusting internal prices 
of MNEs can put them on equal economic footing with comparable 
independent entities is therefore erroneous. 
Furthermore, a corollary to considering MNEs as integrated 
productive enterprises is the fact that transfer prices have no economic 
substance. Recall the hypothetical U.S. producer of televisions proposed in 
the Introduction. Production costs were $100 per unit with a sale price of 
$150, netting a profit margin of $50 per unit from the total productive 
enterprise, including manufacturing and marketing. The constituent U.S. 
and Hong Kong entities worked toward a unitary profit goal, with the 
transfer price charged between the entities a wholly arbitrary number, an 
artifact of their distinct corporate personalities under the law with no 
relation to the economic reality of the productive venture. There are of 
course real economic distinctions between the two related entities, such as 
employment in the respective locations, assets, and other costs distinct to 
the respective entities. However, the transfer price bears no rational relation 
to any real distinction, and a transfer price set to a hypothetical arms-length 
price may only incidentally and partially reflect the respective contributions 
of related entities to the collective productive activity. By assuming 
independence between the parties that does not exist in reality, arms-length 
pricing will by necessity fail to quantify synergistic gains and the value 
added to each related member by the other in an integrated enterprise.62 
 
 60.  See John J.A. Burke, Rethinking First Principles of Transfer Pricing Rules, 30 VA. TAX REV. 
613, 627 (2011). 
 61.  Id. 
 62.  See id.at 626-27. 
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Given that the main theoretical premises of ALS are based on an 
erroneous economic assumption about the relatedness of entities in an 
integrated enterprise, it is worth revisiting the rationale for continued 
commitment to ALS. Why commit to a principle that a casual acquaintance 
with firm economics demonstrates to be an economic fallacy? Consider 
that the transfer pricing problem is produced by the mismatch between 
increasing shares of income produced by integrated global entities that are 
taxed on a national level. The facility to reallocate income and ALS as a 
reallocation standard were a response to preserve national tax bases in 
international enterprises, an increasingly difficult task. It is natural, then, 
that the preference of national taxing authorities is for individual, discrete 
business entities over global, transnational entities. ALS pursues this 
preference by attempting to treat integrated MNEs as discrete economic 
agents with a discrete tax base identifiable on a national level. This impulse 
of ALS today is the same as the original, but augmented with a greater 
urgency due to global commerce unconstrained by national boundaries. 
B. The Administrative Failure of ALS63 
In criticizing ALS, it is not enough to point out that it is premised on a 
legal fiction that disregards the true economics of MNEs. While the notion 
that payments which have no economic substance can somehow be made 
correct is, on an economic level, nonsensical, it is necessary to interrogate 
ALS solely as a corporate tax base allocation mechanism. Ultimately, ALS 
is also a failure on the level of administrability, not because it is a legal 
fiction as such, but because, when considering how to allocate the MNE 
corporate tax base, transfer pricing does not reliably correspond to any 
reasonable measure of how the tax base ought to be allocated. Furthermore, 
to the extent that ALS might incidentally correspond to a reasonable 
measure of allocation, it is an ambiguous and difficult to ascertain metric, 
especially in comparison to easily ascertainable, real measures of economic 
activity. 
To judge the administrability of ALS—whether, as a general matter, it 
works—means to determine its suitability for the purpose of allocating 
MNE tax bases. In order to answer that question, it is necessary to first 
consider what factors determine how income should be allocated among 
national taxing jurisdictions. Recall the original rationale for the corporate 
level income tax, as articulated by Thomas Adams. The purpose of the tax 
was to cover the collective costs of maintaining the public markets, the 
 
 63.  By “administrative failure” I mean to capture administration in the broadest sense of the term; 
how ALS works, or does not work, in practice. 
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necessary preconditions for the productive activity of business entities.64 
Thus the significance of the underpayment of taxes was expressed in terms 
of failure to recompense the full costs imposed and benefits derived from 
the use of community assets.65 Using this burden/benefit analysis as a 
starting point for judging an allocation mechanism means that the 
mechanism should provide some reasonable proxy for burdens/benefits that 
permit a relative allocation of the total tax in proportion to the necessary 
compensation. 
In addition to a connection to burdens/benefits imposed, an allocation 
mechanism should have an easily ascertainable connection to the respective 
taxing jurisdiction. Under the prevailing norms, the corporate tax base 
consists of net income, and that tax base is allocated based on the source of 
the income. Income from production of rail cars in Canada, for instance, is 
Canadian-source income, and Canada is entitled to levy a tax on the net 
benefit derived from that productive activity.66 However, it is precisely this 
clear connection between income and territory that is undermined by the 
transfer pricing problem. Thus an effective system for allocating the 
income of MNEs will provide a measure of economic activity which is 
clearly connected with the respective taxing jurisdictions. 
Evaluating ALS in light of the foregoing, ALS begins with the 
question, “What would comparable independent parties have bargained 
for?” This may ultimately prevent opportunistic income-shifting that would 
have resulted in undercompensation from the burden/benefit standpoint. 
However, setting arms-length prices between related entities as such bears 
no direct relationship to the burdens/benefits of those entities in their 
respective jurisdictions. In terms of connecting activity to a particular 
jurisdiction, ALS functions to directly reallocate income, so it would seem 
to satisfy the clear connection requirement. However, transfer prices are a 
legal fiction with no real economic substance outside of tax adjustments. 
Because benefits and burdens are related to real costs, they will not align 
with the deemed income allocated by ALS. 
Even if ALS was suitable for allocating the tax base of MNEs as a 
theoretical matter, the highly subjective nature of ascertaining arms-length 
prices creates disproportionate administrative burdens, especially relative 
 
 64.  See Adams, supra note 24. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Note that the U.S. income tax is residence-based, taxing residents on worldwide income 
regardless of source. However, offsetting credits for foreign tax paid, e.g., from a US company doing 
business in Canada, are generally available, so the net effect of this principle holds. See CHARLES H. 
GUSTAFSON & RICHARD C. PUGH, TAXATION OF INTERNATIONAL TRANSACTIONS 33, 39 (4th ed. 
1995). 
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to other easily ascertainable, real measures of economic activity. ALS 
relies on completely fictional accounting figures, which MNEs are required 
to maintain for compliance purposes, rather than real measures of economic 
activity that are already available through standard accounting practices 
and often audited. This fictional accounting, which requires documented 
justification for transfer prices, amounts to a massive burden and a cause of 
considerable anxiety for MNEs.67 
ALS is not a failure administratively simply because it is based upon a 
legal fiction. It is a failure because it is based upon a legal fiction that 
complicates and obfuscates instead of clarifying and simplifying. Compare 
another legal fiction in tax law, depreciation deductions.68 The U.S. 
depreciation rules provide for fictional, scheduled depreciation deductions 
for enumerated asset classes.69 This necessitates a phantom accounting 
system which adjusts the bases of firm assets in a manner that does not 
reflect economic reality.70 The tradeoff that the depreciation rules make is 
for a fictitious but highly administrable system rather than a financially 
accurate but administratively difficult system (annual appraisal of all 
physical assets). If you are going to create a phantom accounting system, it 
should be highly standardized and predictable, with judgment calls only at 
the margins. ALS, by contrast, is uncertain, subjective in every case, and 
frequently subject to challenge and revision. A legal fiction that does not 
gain simplicity or administrability in the bargain is an administrative 
failure, especially when there are feasible alternatives that are real 
measures of economic activity and readily ascertainable. 
As an illustration of the multifaceted dysfunction of ALS in practice, 
consider the famous transfer pricing case of Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. 
Commissioner.71 Bausch & Lomb (B&L), a manufacturer of contact lenses, 
developed and patented the spin cast method for manufacturing soft contact 
lenses, which enabled production costs of approximately $1.50 per lens, 
while alternative methods used by competitors cost at least $3.00 per lens72 
B&L subsequently licensed the technology to wholly-owned Irish 
subsidiary B&L Ireland.73 B&L Ireland manufactured the lenses at a cost of 
approximately $1.50 per lens and then sold them to B&L for $7.50 per lens 
 
 67.  See RHOADES & LANGER, supra note 43, § 18.02; Rhoades, supra note 49. 
 68.  See 26 U.S.C. § 167 (2006) (amended 2007); § 168 (amended 2010). 
 69.  See id. 
 70.  For purposes of corporate valuation, depreciation is added back in, as it is not a real 
adjustment to the value of firm assets. 
 71.  Bausch & Lomb Inc. v. Comm’r, 92 T.C. 525 (1989), aff’d, 933 F.2d 1084 (2d Cir. 1991). 
 72.  Id. at 550. 
 73.  Id. at 563-64. 
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(the transfer price.)74 The IRS, in challenging the transfer price as 
artificially high, argued that B&L Ireland was analogous to a contract 
manufacturer because sale of its total production was assured. Because it 
did not bear the risks of an independent manufacturer, B&L Ireland is only 
entitled to cost plus a comparable contract manufacturer markup.75 B&L 
argued for application of the comparable uncontrolled price method, 
presenting evidence that the $7.50 per lens price was at or below the price 
which would have been charged by comparable uncontrolled manufacturers 
for similar lenses.76 The court found that comparable uncontrolled price 
was the appropriate method, with $7.50 a reasonable per unit price, in part 
because B&L Ireland was not contractually bound to sell the lenses it 
produced to B&L.77 
The Bausch & Lomb case illustrates several troubling aspects of 
administering ALS in practice. First, the treatment of the parent and 
subsidiary as separate entities is particularly absurd in this case, as it is 
clear that the transaction in question would not have occurred but for the 
relatedness of the parties. Second, in the clear absence of comparable 
uncontrolled transactions (given the novel manufacturing technology), the 
IRS and the taxpayer submitted equally plausible arguments, in so far as 
both fit the transaction into an accepted pricing method, and neither form 
resembled the economic reality of the transaction. Finally, the disposition 
of the case, while defensible from the standpoint of ALS, was perverse 
from the standpoint of economic reality. The dramatically lower 
manufacturing costs were produced in the United States through 
technology development, but the return on that U.S. productive activity in 
the form of higher margins was booked in Ireland. A tax avoidance 
provision was used to sanction a bald tax avoidance structure because of a 
hypothetical comparable market price that bore no relationship to the 
economic reality of B&L’s productive activity. 
Rather than a complex, ambiguous legal fiction, the economic reality 
of the productive enterprise—in the form of easily ascertainable, real 
economic factors—is the best proxy for allocating the tax base of MNEs in 
terms of determining burden and benefit with respect to a particular taxing 
jurisdiction. Depending upon arms-length transfer pricing adjustments is a 
 
 74.  Id. at 583. 
 75.  Id. at 583, 588. 
 76.  Id. at 587. 
 77.  Id. at 591-93. B&L was not committed to purchase the production of B&L Ireland; therefore, 
it bore the risks of an independent producer, and it was entitled to the market prices commanded by 
analogous independent producers. If B&L committed to purchase the entire production, it would need 
to be compensated for taking on that additional risk in the form of a discounted unit price. See id. 
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dysfunctional solution to a problem that is needlessly perpetuated by the 
insistence on separate entity treatment and the significance of transfer 
prices. 
III. REFORMS AND ALTERNATIVES 
Substantial reform or outright replacement of ALS seems inevitable as 
the allocation of global corporate income through transfer pricing becomes 
increasingly untenable and perceptions of unjust tax results from 
intellectual property holding companies in tax havens and periodic 
repatriation holidays reach a political boiling point. This final section will 
consider potential reforms and evaluate their suitability based on whether 
they utilize (i) real, easily identifiable economic factors (ii) which can be 
used to approximate relative benefits and burdens on a particular tax 
jurisdiction (iii) relative to the entity considered as a whole. These criteria 
necessitate beginning with the MNE considered as a single entity. Reforms 
and alternatives to ALS fall into two broad categories: unilateral reforms, 
changes that can be implemented by individual national taxing authorities, 
and multilateral reforms, changes in international law and institutions 
which require collective action. 
A. Multilateral Reform 
Multilateral reform is the most theoretically complete mechanism for 
instituting alternatives to the current ALS regime. Because the core aspect 
of any reform is taking the economic reality of the MNE as an integrated 
enterprise rather than the legal fiction of control group member 
independence, the corporate tax base of MNEs will be defined at the first 
instance on a global level. It follows that in order to comprehensively avoid 
the possibility of double taxation, mutual agreement as to how that tax base 
is defined is necessary. The starting point for the most complete approach 
to reform, therefore, is the global consolidated tax base. 
Only one credible reform proposal approaches this ideal case: the EU 
Proposal for Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (“CCCTB”). The 
CCCTB, currently under consideration by the European Commission, is a 
proposed single set of rules defining taxable income in the EU along with a 
single consolidated tax return for the entirety of a company’s activity 
within the EU.78 The tax base would effect a unitary profit and loss 
calculation, but preserve the right of individual member states to set rates.79 
 
 78.  European Comm’n, Common Tax Base, TAXATION AND CUSTOMS UNION, http://ec.europa.eu 
/taxation_customs/taxation/company_tax/common_tax_base/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 19, 2012). 
 79.  Id. 
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Most importantly from the standpoint of reforming ALS, the CCCTB 
proposal incorporates a formulary apportionment for the sharing of the 
consolidated corporate tax base.80 The apportionment to individual 
members of a control group is a function of sales, payroll, and assets, 
equally weighted. 81 A consolidated tax base apportioned on a formulary 
basis means that the CCCTB would solve the transfer pricing problem 
within the EU by making intra-firm transactions irrelevant to the 
calculation of income. 
While the implementation of the CCCTB would solve the transfer 
pricing problem within the EU, it is an incomplete solution. In a post-
CCCTB world, the EU would simply resemble a single national taxing 
authority in the context of the global transfer pricing scheme. Absent 
further reform, ALS would remain the relevant standard for setting transfer 
prices between related parties in the EU and other national taxing 
jurisdictions. While incomplete, the CCCTB might serve as a stepping 
stone to more comprehensive reform. It is likely that a single EU tax base 
would substantially reduce barriers to collective action, with agreement 
between the U.S., United Kingdom, and consolidated EU likely sufficient 
to initiate major changes in the larger transfer pricing regime. 
B. Unilateral Reform 
Notwithstanding the numerous failings of ALS, its enduring advantage 
over alternative approaches is its widespread adoption, which permits 
collective action on the basis of ALS and provides critical protection from 
double taxation through bilateral tax treaties. As a result, any unilateral 
reform will have to contend with the existing international framework that 
premises MNE income allocation on making transfer pricing adjustments in 
accordance with ALS. However, there is still room for unilateral action that 
is compatible with the existing ALS-dominated international law 
framework. This section will consider modifications to current law which 
displace or augment ALS with formulary apportionment, a system which 
allocates income based on the proportion of fixed economic factors in a 
given jurisdiction. 
 
 80.  Proposal for a Council Directive on a Common Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB), 
art. 86, COM (2011) 121 final (Mar. 16, 2011). 
 81.  Id. The merits of the formula itself, a variation on the “Massachusetts Formula,” are discussed 
infra Part III.B. 
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1. Formulary Apportionment as an Effective Tool for Apportioning 
Income Using Real Economic Factors 
The mechanism traditionally contrasted with ALS when considering 
how to apportion income across taxing jurisdictions is known as formulary 
apportionment, since it apportions income in fixed proportion to certain 
specified factors, expressed in a formula. The proposed formula for the EU 
CCCTB discussed in the prior section is one example of formulary 
apportionment, itself modeled on what is known as the “Massachusetts 
Formula”: allocating total entity income to a particular jurisdiction in 
proportion to property, payroll, and sales in that jurisdiction, giving equal 
weight to each.82 The U.S. states and Canadian provinces have long used 
some variation on the Massachusetts Formula to allocate the state level 
corporate income tax base of domestic entities, recognizing that large 
enterprises operate on a national scale such that state-by-state accounting 
would be distortive of economic reality—imagine the enormous folly of 
requiring transfer pricing documentation for intra-company movement of 
goods and services across state lines.83 This scenario is really no different 
than MNEs in the international context, except that barriers to collective 
action on the state level are far lower than for the international system, and 
when the respective systems were instituted, the national economy was 
integrated in a way that resembles the contemporary global economy. 
Replacing or augmenting ALS with some variation on the Massachusetts 
Formula is the starting point for every unilateral reform proposal; no 
serious reform in the academic literature is known to the author which 
proposes to retain transfer pricing as the sole mechanism for allocating 
MNE income. 
Formulary apportionment in general has been criticized on several 
grounds. First, it has been criticized as an arbitrary, if predictable division 
of corporate income, in contrast to the use of transfer pricing according to 
ALS, which attempts to estimate the actual division of income among 
members of a related group84 However, as was demonstrated in Part II of 
this paper, the notion that transfer prices at arms-length prices reflects the 
“true” income of related parties is itself a fallacy. This was due in part to 
the fact that the notion of the “true” location of income for MNEs in a 
global economy is itself a circular concept. The income is unitary and 
produced in a transnational fashion. How it is divided is precisely the 
 
 82.  Reuven S. Avi-Yonah, Kimberly A. Clausing & Michael C. Durst, Allocating Business 
Profits for Tax Purposes: A Proposal To Adopt a Formulary Profit Split, 9 FLA. TAX REV. 497, 508-09 
(2009).  
 83.  See id. at 501. 
 84.  See id. at 516. 
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normative problem that should frame any analysis of reform. In contrast to 
transfer pricing, a formulary apportionment approach is at least capable of 
addressing the proper framing question of MNE tax base division, rather 
than persisting in the erroneous assumption that related entities transact at 
arms-length. 
2. Proposed Applications of Formulary Apportionment 
The dominant variation of formulary apportionment advocated for in 
the international tax reform literature focuses on a single factor of the 
traditional formula as a proposed replacement for transfer pricing: the 
proportion of total sales in a jurisdiction. As the proponents of sales-based 
formulary apportionment note, many states already weight the sales factor 
of their apportionment formulas heavily, for two principal reasons.85 First, 
destination-based sales figures are straightforward to account for and 
apportion, whereas property in particular requires periodic valuation.86 
Second, there has been a concern that businesses might be discouraged 
from locating jobs and investment in a state which assesses taxes based on 
property and employment.87 Sales are less sensitive to differences in tax 
rates across jurisdictions, and the incentive to maximize sales is essentially 
constant even in high-tax jurisdictions.88 
Several methods for implementing formulary apportionment have 
been suggested. Most straightforward, the transfer pricing rules could be 
displaced directly by a formulary apportionment system.89 Under this 
implementation, sales-based formulary apportionment under single-entity 
tax accounting would displace the entire edifice of international tax law 
built around the use of separate entity accounting and transfer pricing, 
including the need for many foreign business tax credits and most of 
Subpart F of the Internal Revenue Code.90 Another prominent proposal 
would have sales-based formulary apportionment implemented as a 
variation on the residual profit split method, a transfer pricing method 
implemented by many OECD countries.91 Under this implementation, an 
estimated market return would first be assigned to the deductible expenses 
incurred in each country (the “routine income”), and any residual income 
 
 85.  Susan C. Morse, Revisiting Global Formulary Apportionment, 29 VA. TAX REV. 593, 594 
(2010). 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Id. 
 88.  Avi-Yonah, et al., supra note 82, at 509. 
 89.  See Morse, supra note 84, at 594. 
 90.  Id. at 600-03. 
 91.  See Avi-Yonah, et al., supra note 82, at 500. 
RECTENWALD EIC 2 MACRO - TO PO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2012  3:27 PM 
446 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 23:425 
would be allocated based on the relative sales in each country.92 Finally, 
formulary apportionment could be applied only to a subset of intra-
company transactions, such as financial transactions, which the current 
transfer pricing system especially fails to account for accurately.93 Under 
such an implementation, transfer pricing according to ALS would be 
retained for transactions with an easily-ascertainable market price, with 
formulary apportionment for financial transactions, which are otherwise 
subject to widespread abuse using transfer pricing.94 
3. A Flexible Approach: Tailoring Formulary Apportionment Based 
on Type of Income 
Given the range of proposed reforms, what should an alternative to 
ALS look like? A dominant feature of current formulary apportionment 
proposals is the use of outbound sales as opposed to other “supply side” 
factors.95 However, if we accept that an underlying norm of allocation 
should be its correspondence to measures of economic benefit/burden in 
the jurisdiction, then it would be desirable to have labor and capital factors 
reflected in any formulary apportionment. While outbound sales would 
divide income based on the extent to which an MNE avails itself of 
particular markets for its goods and services, such costs are only one aspect 
of dividing the income base in a normatively desirable way. A significant 
criticism of using production factors in the apportionment calculation, and 
a concern of the states which weight sales more heavily, is that including 
capital and labor creates “an implicit tax on the factors used in the 
formula.”96 The fear is that this inclusion would in turn discourage locating 
factors of production in high-tax jurisdictions. However, this rationale for 
excluding productive factors from formulary apportionment is deficient for 
two reasons. First, it is implicitly based on a “tax competition” normative 
foundation, which as a guiding principle is not well-equipped to answer the 
question of where multinational income ought to be taxed. It is a response 
in part to collective action problems, but not directly to the question of 
allocation on a formal level. Second, if reform of ALS is performed in 
revenue-neutral fashion, U.S. corporate tax rates could be lowered 
 
 92.  See id. at 509. For the existing rules on which this method is based see Treas. Reg. § 1.482-6 
(2011) and OECD TRANSFER PRICING GUIDELINES, supra note 7, at 191-203. 
 93.  See, e.g., Ilan Benshalom, Taxing the Financial Income of Multinational Enterprises by 
Employing a Hybrid Formulary and Arm’s Length Allocation Method, 28 VA. TAX REV. 619 (2009).  
 94.  Id. 
 95.  See, e.g., Susan C. Morse, Revisiting Global Formulary Apportionment, 29 VA. TAX REV. 
593, 594 (2010); Avi-Yonah, et al., supra note 82, at 498. 
 96.  Avi-Yonah, et al., supra note 82, at 509. 
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considerably,97 eliminating in large part the tax-competitive concerns of 
including factors of production in a formulary apportionment. 
In addition to the factors themselves, the second major problem with 
the implementation of a formulary apportionment reform is the inevitability 
that a single multifactor formula will allocate at least some types of income 
arbitrarily. Unless we use strictly destination sales, the other production 
factors and the weight assigned to them represent judgments about how 
income was produced and how relevant each factor is to a productive 
activity in a particular taxing jurisdiction. The oil industry, for instance, has 
objected to allocating income based on property and payroll, since profits 
derive largely from the oil reserves themselves, an element not reflected in 
the traditional formula because companies do not typically own the 
reserves directly.98 Under the Massachusetts Formula, therefore, an oil 
producer’s income will be allocated arbitrarily, in so far as that allocation 
does not reflect the source of profits and the benefits/burdens 
corresponding to its productive activity. 
In light of both the desirability of including factors of production in 
any formulary apportionment and the concern that any single formula will 
allocate some income arbitrarily, this paper proposes a flexible approach 
which uses multifactor formulas applied to particular categories of 
income.99 This approach is flexible in that a national taxing authority could 
establish the income categories and corresponding formulas as broadly or 
narrowly as necessary to allocate income in a sufficiently non-arbitrary 
fashion. 
To illustrate the advantages of this flexible implementation of 
formulary apportionment, consider the case of an oil company which 
engages in both production and refining activity. Under a variation of the 
Massachusetts formula, the company’s refining activity will be allocated in 
a way that reasonably reflects both the source of income from refining and 
the benefit/burden of the refining activity in the appropriate jurisdiction, 
since refining is a relatively capital- and labor-intensive productive activity, 
and the Massachusetts formula gives weight to those factors. However, the 
company’s oil production income will be misallocated to the extent that 
property and employment are excessively weighted in the Massachusetts 
formula relative to the contribution of those factors to oil production 
income. The company might, for instance, perform all of their drilling 
activity in Canada but have the vast majority of property and payroll in the 
 
 97.  See id. at 507. 
 98.  Id. at 516. 
 99.  Separate tax accounting treatment for different categories or baskets of income is already a 
common feature in the tax code. See, e.g., 26 U.S.C. § 901 (Foreign Tax Credit Rules). 
RECTENWALD EIC 2 MACRO - TO PO (DO NOT DELETE) 6/5/2012  3:27 PM 
448 DUKE JOURNAL OF COMPARATIVE & INTERNATIONAL LAW [Vol 23:425 
U.S., leading to excessive allocation of oil production income to the U.S. If 
instead we apply a destination sales-based allocation, the risk of over-
allocation based on the location of employees and investments is 
eliminated, but as a pure demand-side measure, the allocation could fail to 
capture the complete benefit/burden of the company in the U.S., where it 
has availed itself of labor markets and all the conditions necessary to 
support capital-intensive productive activity. 
A flexible formulary apportionment makes it possible to correct for 
the risks of over-allocation while also accounting for the supply-side 
benefit/burden through the inclusion of productive factors appropriate to 
the category of income. In the case of the oil company, a flexible approach 
would put the overall income of the company into two baskets: production 
income and refining income. The formulary allocation of refining income 
would give adequate weight to payroll and property, to reflect the 
contribution of those factors in the generation of refining-related income. 
The formula for oil production income would by contrast give less weight 
to property and payroll, and include factors tailored to oil production. A 
flexible formulary apportionment would even allow for readily-
ascertainable, industry specific metrics for allocation, such as 
measurements of wellheads or output. 
A flexible formulary apportionment approach has the potential for 
considerable complexity, depending upon the degree to which the formulas 
implemented by national taxing authorities are narrowly tailored to specific 
income-producing activities. However, the complexity is based on 
objective factors, and the difficult decision-making happens at rule 
formation rather than rule application. Thus the complex, subjective 
application of transfer pricing rules would be replaced with a complex, but 
narrowly-tailored and objective formulary apportionment system. 
CONCLUSION 
It is clear that transfer pricing using ALS as a mechanism for 
allocating the income of MNEs is broken and unsustainable in its 
administration and for the purposes of revenue collection. Reform based on 
some form of formulary apportionment is the best alternative method to 
allocated MNE income based on real, readily ascertainable economic 
factors. Furthermore, if we wish to return to the original, normatively-
coherent basis for entity-level taxation premised upon the benefits enjoyed 
and burdens imposed by the productive activities of business entities, any 
reform based on formulary apportionment should consider more than 
destination-based sales, as this is only one economic factor of the 
benefit/burden in a particular jurisdiction. In consideration of the 
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propensity for any single formula solution to allocate at least some kinds of 
income arbitrarily, this paper proposes a basketing approach with different 
allocation formulas based on different categories of income, in order to 
tailor allocation to different forms of productive activity while maintaining 
single-entity taxation according to objective economic factors. 
However ostensibly fair, efficient, or politically feasible any 
formulary apportionment reform proposal might appear, prospects for this 
kind of comprehensive reform are uncertain. Though taxes are the price of 
civilization, and corporate taxes, perhaps, are the price of secure, 
functioning markets, the corporate taxpayers with the greatest pull over tax 
policy are preoccupied by a culture of tax avoidance.100 In other words, it is 
not clear that the cultural moment is ripe for international tax reform based 
conceptually on benefits enjoyed and burdens imposed by MNEs, even if 
that is the most coherent basis for the allocation of the global corporate tax 
base. 
Regardless of present cultural attitudes relative to taxation, there is a 
growing consensus, at least academically, that ALS is hopelessly outmoded 
and broken. The benign explanation for the persistence of the current ALS 
regime is simple path dependence—so much is invested in this form of 
international taxation that the costs of exit exceed the benefits of a more 
rational, administrable system. The cynical explanation takes as its starting 
point the emerging cycle of massive offshore tax deferral in anticipation of 
the next repatriation holiday.101 The few large entities capable of benefiting 
from ALS have far more to lose in the transition to a level, transparent 
system than the rest have to gain from such reform, a political asymmetry 
not easily overcome. 
 
 
 100.  See generally Henry Ordower, The Culture of Tax Avoidance, 55 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 47 (2011). 
 101.  As an illustration of the asymmetry of political incentives, consider that those (relatively few) 
firms which advocated for and then availed themselves of the 2004 repatriation holiday realized an 
average return of 22,000% on their lobbying investment. See generally Raquel Alexander, Steven W. 
Mazza & Susan Scholz, Measuring Rates of Return for Lobbying Expenditures: An Empirical Analysis 
under the American Jobs Creation Act, 25 J.L. & POL. 401 (2009). 
